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This paper examines the theory of the resource curse in relation to Botswana 
and Nigeria, two countries in Africa abundant in natural resources. After 
reviewing existing literature relevant to the topic, this paper considers 
policies and regulations used in the management of natural resources from 
both countries in an attempt to find out how Botswana has managed to be 
identified as a country enjoying unmatched growth rates in Africa while 
Nigeria is barely taking advantage of the resources available to it. This 
analysis will serve as a reference point to the Ghanaian government on steps 
to take to avoid the resource curse in its enthusiasm to benefit from the 
Jubilee oil fields. With regards to Ghana, this paper reviews the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act and its provisions for the collection and 
distribution of petroleum revenue in the country. The paper focuses on anti-
corruption measures used in both countries to ensure the fair and equitable 
distribution of rent. The paper comes to the conclusion that transparency 
plays a key role in the growth and development of a country especially when 
it comes to resource revenue. It must therefore be noted that institutions 
play an important role in the management of resource revenue, and even 
though it is important to learn from other successful countries, policies used 
to combat corruption must be modified to suit the economic, political, social 
and legal environment of the particular country. 
Keywords: natural resources, resource curse, institutions, corruption 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
According to the 2010 World Trade Report, natural resources are defined as 
“stocks of materials that exist in the natural environment that are both 
scarce and economically useful in production or consumption, either in their 
raw state or after a minimal amount of processing”. Examples are oil and 
gas, gold, diamond, copper, nickel, emerald and uranium. Some countries 
are considered rich today due to the simple fact that they have effectively 
managed the natural resources which they have access to. Examples of these 
countries are Canada whose provinces like Alberta and Saskatchewan are 
endowed with coal, oil and gas, which have contributed to higher production 
in sectors like banking, retail and real-estate (Macquarie, 2011).  
The same however, cannot be said for other countries who are abundant in 
some of these same resources but still find themselves in the undesirable 
category of low-income or developing countries. Gylfason (2001) points out 
that out of 65 countries which can be described as resource-rich, only four 
(Botswana, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) have managed to achieve 
long-term investment of an average of more than 25% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) from 1970 to 1998, and a per capita Gross National Product 
(GNP) growth of an average of more than 4% per year for the same period.  
Sachs and Warner (1995 and 2001) (as cited by Carmignani and Chowdhury, 
2010) describe this curious occurrence where resource-rich countries perform 
poorly as the resource curse. However, the criteria for determining why a 
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country with resources will suffer the resource curse remains unclear in the 
literature. 
Africa is ranked number one in the production of mineral resources like gold, 
platinum, cobalt and diamonds (Twerefou, 2009). This paper focuses on oil 
and diamond production in Africa because, as Twerefou (2009) points out, 
“the large deposits of mineral resources in Africa indicate that the continent 
has a wealth of natural capital which, if exploited sustainably, could turn the 
continent around”. This paper seeks to find out what oil and diamond rich 
African countries are doing to maximize the benefits they get from these 
minerals.  
The table below shows some of the major oil producers in the world in 2009: 
Table 1.1: Major producers of oil1 in 2009 
Country 





Federation 10032 1.50% 
Saudi Arabia 9713 -10.60% 
Iran 4216 -3.30% 
China 3790 -2.80% 
Nigeria 2061 -3.60% 
 
(Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010) 
                                                             
1 Includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (the liquid content of natural gas where this is recovered 
separately). Excludes liquid fuels from other sources such as biomass and coal derivatives. 
2 Annual changes and shares of total are calculated using million tonnes per annum figures. Growth rates 
are adjusted for leap years. 
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The table below shows the contribution of oil to the total export revenue of 
the 5 major oil producers in 2009 and their GDP per capita for the same 
year:  
Table 1.2: Contribution of crude oil to total export revenue in 2009 
Country 
Share of total 
exports 
 GDP per 
capita3 in 
2009 
Russian Federation   31%                   $8,614.03  
Saudi Arabia 73.94%  $14,744.61  
Iran 78.17%  $4,334.13  
China 0.18%  $3,738.95  
Nigeria 84.50%  $1,111.75  
 
(Source: International Trade Centre, 2010 and Economy Watch, 2011) 
Table 2 shows that most of these oil producing countries are dependent on 
crude oil for a majority of their export revenue. With crude oil contributing 
almost 85% to Nigeria’s export revenue, it is evident that with their low 
status of development, the country is not making good use of their revenue 
from crude oil exports. 




                                                             
3 GDP per capita is expressed in current US dollars. 
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Table 1.3: Major producers of diamond in 2008 and 2009 
Country 
Diamonds4 
produced in  2008 
Diamonds produced 
in 2009 
Botswana 25000 32000 
Russia 23300 21900 
Canada 18000 12000 
Angola 10000 8000 
South Africa 6100 5200 
 
(Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, as cited in geology.com) 
The table below shows the contribution of precious stones to the total export 
revenue of the 5 major diamond producers in 2009: 
Table 1.4: Contribution of precious stones to total export revenue in 2009 
Country   Share of total exports 
GDP per capita5 in 
2009 
Botswana   64.85% $6,436.95 
Russia   0.40% $8,614.03 
Canada   3.34% $39,682.89 
Angola   1.15% $4,081.98 
South Africa   15.69% $5,757.84 
 
(Source: International Trade Centre, 2010 and Economy Watch, 2011)  
The table above shows that out of the 5 countries, diamonds contribute the 
most to Botswana’s revenue. In a public lecture at the Bank of Botswana in 
2011, Naoyuki Shinohara, Deputy Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), described Botswana as “a model for resource-rich 
                                                             
4 The values above are estimated gem-quality diamond production per calendar year in thousands of 
carats.  
5 GDP per capita is expressed in current US dollars. 
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countries of how to manage resource wealth prudently.” (Shinohara, 2011) It 
is therefore evident that Botswana is making good use of its revenue from 
natural resources.  
It is not wrong to conjecture that the presence of natural resources in a 
particular country should result in economic development. Chenery and 
Strout (1966) argue with the two-gap model that resource wealth has to be 
properly allocated for success of the economy. Natural resources increase 
wealth and purchasing power in a country so resource abundance is expected 
to increase an economy’s growth rates (Sachs and Warner, 1997). Sachs and 
Warner (1999) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) (as cited in Iimi, 
2006) hold similar views on the importance of natural resources by 
explaining that resource wealth increases investment in economic 
infrastructure and develops human capital which helps to improve the 
economy. Resource wealth can also lead to an increase in the rate of savings 
and investment which, according to the Harrod-Domar model, will ultimately 
result in rapid growth of the economy (Todaro and Smith, 2006). This is 
however not always a reality. After gathering data from 89 countries, Iimi 
(2006) concluded that an abundance of natural resources in a country does 
not necessarily guarantee growth.  
According to Sachs and Warner (1997), modern economic growth is 
characterized by resource-poor economies doing much better than resource-
rich economies in terms of economic growth. This is evident with data 
collected from a sample of 95 countries from 1970 to 1990, where it was 
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realized that countries which, in 1970, started by having a high proportion of 
natural resources to GDP experienced relatively slower growth than the other 
countries during the 20-year period.  
However, Norway is an example of a country which challenges the resource 
curse theory of Sachs and Warner (2001). As the largest oil producer and 
exporter in all of Western Europe in 2010, Norway provided OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Europe with 12% 
of its crude oil imports and 18% of its natural gas imports (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2010). The Norwegian government has used 
revenue from oil to not only increase investment in, among other things, 
environmental sustainability, provision of social welfare services and 
education, but also to give aid to developing nations like Tanzania, Zambia 
and Ethiopia (Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2011). 
In spite of the abundant and credible information available on these countries 
and the effective strategies they used which helped them to use the 
resources to grow, good natural resource management seems still to be an 
incomprehensible notion. For most of sub-Saharan Africa, most people live in 
abject poverty and development is needed the most. For example, in her 
2007 report entitled Undermining development? Copper mining in Zambia, 
Abi Dymond describes copper mining as the backbone of the Zambian 
economy with a 75% contribution to the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings. However, the people of Zambia experience high levels of poverty 
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with 68% of the population living on less than US$1 per day (Dymond, 
2007).  
Several factors are responsible for this divergence from the norm where we 
would expect that the presence of resources in a country would result in an 
increase in wealth and a resulting increase in investment and growth rates 
(Sachs and Warner, 1997). Some of them are: 
1. First, it is possible that a country which has an abundance of natural 
resources might end up depending on natural resource export for 
growth. This may lead its citizens to laziness as compared to people 
from “barren” lands who find that hard work is a necessity for survival. 
It is therefore important for a country to progress from a mentality of 
dependence on primary exports to one of manufacturing where more 
labour is needed and a higher standard of living is almost assured 
(Sachs and Warner, 1997). 
2. Second, according to Sachs and Warner (1997), the Dutch disease 
model explains that a country rich in natural resources has the 
tendency to concentrate its factors of production (labour and capital) 
in the agricultural sector at the expense of the manufacturing sector. 
The “disease” here is the diminishing of the manufacturing sector 
which can lead to a slow growth rate because the economy will not 
enjoy the benefits of increasing returns to scale which is a major 
characteristic of the manufacturing sector. Cordon and Neary (1982) 
(as cited by Iimi 2006, p.5) also explain that sectors like 
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manufacturing are likely to suffer from the appreciation of the national 
currency which comes about due to the fact that earnings from natural 
resources are utilized by the ‘domestic non-tradable sector.’ 
3. Also, Sachs and Warner raise the point that most young people go to 
school because they hope to obtain the skills they need to be 
employed in the manufacturing sector. If however a country invests 
heavily in its agricultural sector to the disadvantage of its 
manufacturing sector, then most people will choose to forgo education 
because they would expect to get higher wages from agriculture. This, 
in the long run, will lead to a largely uneducated and unskilled 
workforce. 
Iimi (2006, p.4) also adds that natural resource wealth can also bring about 
conflict between stakeholders like politicians, mining companies, local groups 
and citizens who will be ‘naturally motivated to seek unfair resource rents, 
quickly depleting natural resources and wasting resource revenue.’ However, 
according to Mehlum et al. (2006), the primary reason for the differences in 
growth performance among resource-rich countries is the differences in the 
quality of the basic institutions in these countries.  
This paper compares oil-rich Nigeria to diamond-rich Botswana because 
research indicates that no sub-Saharan African country produces crude oil 
equal to the magnitude that Nigeria does and still manages the resources 
from its export efficiently. Also, given that poor resource-rich countries can 
learn from rich resource-rich countries, Nigeria will be compared to Botswana 
instead of a European country like Norway which is also oil-rich because two 
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sub-Saharan African countries provide a fair and equal platform for 
comparison. 
1.2 COUNTRY BACKGROUND 
1.2.1 BOTSWANA 
1.2.1a Botswana Today 
Current economic life: 
Botswana is considered one of the fastest growing middle-income countries 
in the world. This is due to the rising prices of rough diamonds on the 
international market. In order to continue this growth the Batswana 
government has made the decision to diversify the economy from the 
mineral sector to the services sector by supporting growth in the private 
sector. This will reduce the effects of the global economic crisis and help with 
the government’s overall objective to eradicate poverty in the country (IMF, 
2011). 
According to the IMF’s 2011 staff report on Botswana, the government has to 
focus on the high unemployment rate in order to improve the quality of 
growth in the country.  
General data: 
- Name of President – Lt. General Seretse Khama Ian Khama 
- Capital city - Gaborone 
- Major cities – Francistown, Maun, Selebi-Phikwe and Kanye 
- GDP per capita in 2010 (current prices, US Dollars) – US$ 7,627.46 
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- Population – 2,065,398 (July 2011 est.) 
- Inflation rate (Average consumer price change % in 2010) – 6.95%   
- Ranking:  
o Democracy – 39 (out of 150) 
o Media freedom – 49 (out of 150) 
o Internet penetration – 5.9% 
(Source: Economy Watch, 2011 and World Audit, 2001) 
1.2.1b History, Evolution and Development of Botswana  
As at independence in 1966, Acemoglu et al. (2001) point out that conditions 
were not favorable in Botswana to promote much growth. The level of 
education was very poor with only two secondary schools in the country that 
offered the required five-year courses and only 80 Batswana in their final 
year. Also, an unproductive agricultural sector meant that at the time, 10% 
of GDP was used for the importation of food. These conditions led most 
economic analysts to describe Botswana as ‘a dependent underdeveloped 
labour reserve for South Africa’ (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Despite these difficult initial conditions, in the last 35 years, Botswana has 
had the highest per capita growth rate of any country in the world and this, 
according to Acemoglu et al. (2001), can be attributed to the policies 
implemented in Botswana as a result of its solid institutional structure. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) explore the subject of institutions in Botswana by 
asking why, as compared with other African countries, Botswana end up with 
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such good and effective institutions. They attribute this to a number of 
factors: 
1. First, in the pre-colonial era, tribal institutions had a lot of influence 
and placed constraints on the activities of the political elite. 
2. Botswana was not a major concern of the British in colonial times so 
the British did not have a significant effect on these tribal institutions. 
3. After independence, the elites recognized that maintaining and 
reinforcing the established institutions of private property was in their 
best interest because they ensure political stability and encourage 
investment in the country. 
4. Income from diamonds created enough rents for the main political 
actors that nobody wanted to incur the additional cost of looking for 
rents elsewhere. 
5. Important decisions made by post-independence leaders like 
Presidents Seretse Khama and Quett Masire went a long to strengthen 
institutions in Botswana. 
Since independence, Botswana’s national development goals have been 
based on the following objectives: gender equality, environmental 
conservation, social justice and sustained economic growth and 
development. The government has made a lot of effort to achieve these 
objectives. There has been a lot of investment on social services including 
education, health and urban and regional development. Primary and 
secondary education is free while quality health care is either free or for a 
12 
 
token amount. There has also been a decline in population growth due to the 
good policy choices and the decision of educated, urban women to use 
modern contraception (Fibaek, 2010). 
Life in Botswana is however not all rosy. Botswana has one of the highest 
adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world and there are also incidences of 
inequality and high poverty and unemployment rates especially in the rural 
areas (The World Bank, 2010). Nevertheless, Acemoglu et al. (2001) claim 
that Botswana has enjoyed relatively successful economic policies which are 
reflected in its economic progress.  
1.2.2 NIGERIA 
1.2.2a Nigeria Today 
Current economic life: 
Nigeria is recognized for its major oil reserves whose benefits are not 
reflected in the standard of living of the citizens of the country. The 
government of Nigeria is making conscious efforts to direct Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) to sectors like agriculture, manufacturing and services. The 
government is also encouraging investment in the private sector and putting 
in measures to reduce the level of corruption in the country. These actions 
are intended to help eradicate poverty and create better opportunities for all 
Nigerians (UNCTAD, 2009).  
General data: 
- Name of President – Goodluck Jonathan 
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- Capital city - Abuja  
- Major cities – Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Kaduna and Port Harcourt 
- GDP per capita (current prices, US Dollars) – US$ 1,389.31 
- Population – 155,215,573 (July 2011 est.) 
- Inflation rate (Average consumer price change % in 2010) - 
13.72% 
- Ranking:  
o Democracy – 89 (out of 150) 
o Media freedom – 69 (out of 150)  
o Internet penetration – 28.9% 
(Source: Economy Watch, 2011 and World Audit, 2001) 
   1.2.2b History, Evolution and Development of Nigeria 
Nigeria gained independence from the British on October 1st 1960 but did not 
become a Republic until 1963. Even after the first elections in 1964, the 
country went through thirteen years of military coups and two and a half 
years of civil war, characterized by, among other things disease and 
starvation which resulted in the deaths of one to three million Nigerians 
(Library of Congress, p.4) 
Nigeria finally returned to civilian rule in 1979 under President Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari. This happened amid a lot of anticipation of limitless development 
since oil prices were high and revenues from this resource were rising 
steadily. The excitement however came to an end with the end of the oil 
boom in 1981 and the consequent recession. This led to a lot of uncertainty 
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about the effectiveness of civilian rule and the country experienced another 
set of coups and military rule from 1983 to 1998. Corruption thrived in the 
country but especially under General Sani Abacha’s rule (1993-1998) and in 
2005 funds of as much as US$458 million was recovered from personal 
accounts in Swiss banks that Abacha had siphoned from oil revenues (ibid, p. 
5-6). 
 Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo finally took over as a civilian leader 
in 1999 but there were a lot of unexpected problems he had to deal with: 
Religious tensions grew fiercer in 2000, ethnic problems started a tribal war 
in 2001 in the South-East and riots occurred in the oil-rich Niger Delta 
against international workers (ibid, p. 6-7). 
Nigeria is rich in minerals such as coal, gemstones, gold, marble, salt and 
uranium. The mining industry which contributed a lot to GDP in the 1960s 
accounts for only 1% of GDP now because of high production costs but low 
productivity. With oil reserves which make it the tenth largest in the world, 
Nigeria (a member of OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) has oil reserves of 36.2 million barrels and in 2006 it produced 2.4 
million barrels per day of oil. Attacks on oil facilities and workers in 2006 
have however led to a 25% reduction in Nigeria’s oil exports and this 
continued into 2008 (ibid, p. 8-13). 
The Nigerian economy is struggling to control the country’s huge wealth in 
fossil oils in order to eliminate the poverty that affects almost 57% of the 
Nigerian population. The World Bank estimates that 80% of energy revenue 
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helps only 1% of the population and economists call this occurrence of huge 
natural resource wealth and severe poverty in Nigeria and other developing 
countries the “paradox of plenty” or the “curse of oil” (Library of Congress, 
p.10). In 2004, the United Nations (UN) found that Nigeria had made 
progress in providing universal primary education and protecting the 
environment but had however failed to reduce poverty and hunger and child 
maternal mortality (ibid, p.11). 
After coming into office in May 2007, President Umaru Musa Yar’adua 
adopted a policy known as Vision 2020 which hopes to transform Nigeria into 
one of the top-20 economies by the year 2020. Among other things, the 
policy aimed to deal with the problems of agriculture, employment, security 
and education (ibid, p.11).  
In a country report for the World Bank (2011), Foster and Pushak claim that 
compared to most African countries, the Nigerian government has made a lot 
more effort to improve the infrastructure of the country and consequently, 
the lives of the people. Over the last few years, a lot of progress has been 
made in the areas of road and rail transport and the provision of power and 
information and communications technology (ICT) (The World Bank, 2011). 
The electricity sector is being restructured to provide be a reliable source of 
power to many more people. The ICT sector has been privatized. This has 
resulted in Africa’s most active fixed-line service and a wider coverage of 
cheaper mobile services for the people. The domestic air transport sector has 
grown with the introduction of reliable private delivery services (ibid). 
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In spite of all these however, there still remain a number of challenges that 
the Nigerian government must deal with: 
The lack of investment and the inability to produce efficiently and to full 
capacity means that supply of power is very unreliable and only about half 
the demand of power is being met. Health and sanitation is also another 
sector that needs urgent attention. Only a fraction of the nation has access 
to piped water and even this has been falling sharply in recent years. Despite 
the government’s efforts to improve road transport, the roads in Nigeria are 
still in poor state which means that they are not being maintained adequately 
(The World Bank, 2011). 
A lot more needs to be done to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
these different sectors to improve the well-being of the Nigerian people. In 
order to make any progress however, it is obvious that the problem of 
corruption for which Nigeria is so well-known has to be dealt with. In 2007, 
Transparency International ranked Nigeria 147 out of 179 countries in its 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Library of Congress, 2008). 
Todaro and Smith (2006) explain that the removal of corruption is key to 
development because it increases investment and consequently, the growth 






Figure 1.1: A comparison of the level of control of corruption in Botswana, 
Ghana and Nigeria.6 
 
(Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Methodology and Analytical Issues (as cited by the 
World Bank, 2011)). 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the fact that Botswana (75th – 90th percentile) and Ghana 
(50th – 75th percentile) are doing much better at controlling corruption than 
Nigeria who is in the 10th – 25th percentile. It is obvious then that corruption is 
a major problem that has to be dealt with in Nigeria since it could be a 
contributing factor to Nigeria’s underdevelopment. 
Gross Domestic Product or GDP is the market value of all goods and services 
                                                             
6 The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by 
a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. 
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produced in a country within a single year. GDP per capita is therefore 
calculated by dividing GDP by the total population in the country. It is 
therefore used an indicator of standard of living. 
Figure 1.2 shows that Botswana has a considerably higher standard of living 
as compared to Ghana and Nigeria. 
Figure 1.2: A comparison of the GDP per capita of Botswana, Nigeria and 
Ghana. 
 
 (Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators) 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is used to rank countries based on 
standard of living, life expectancy and literacy level. 
Figure 1.3 shows that from 1980 to 2010 Botswana has enjoyed a relatively 

























index showing medium human development (0.50 to 0.799) (Todaro and 
Smith, 2006). 
Figure 1.3: A comparison of the Human Development Index of Botswana, 
Nigeria7 and Ghana. 
 
 (Source: UNDP, International Human Development Indicators) 
Inflation is the rate at which prices of goods and services are rising in a 
country. A high inflation rate means that the purchasing power of citizens is 
falling and they pay more today for less goods and services than they did 
when the inflation rate was lower. 
                                                             
7 Data for Nigeria’s Human Development Index is incomplete because there is no data for Nigeria’s literacy 


















Figure 1.4 shows that Botswana has a had a generally low inflation rate, 
staying mostly in the single digit range while the inflation rates of Ghana and 
Nigeria lie mostly in the double digit range. 




(Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators) 
The above graphs illustrate the fact that in the past 30 years, as is the case 
of the Human Development Index, and in the past 10 years, as is the case of 
the GDP and inflation graphs, Botswana has done much better than both 
Nigeria and Ghana in terms of economic development. It is evident from the 
graphs that Botswana has moved far ahead of the other 2 countries in its 

























1.3  MOTIVATION 
Botswana and Nigeria are two countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are rich in 
many different natural resources. Botswana, on one hand, has avoided the 
resource curse and is one of the fastest growing economies of the world, not 
to mention Africa, while Nigeria is characterized by corruption, inequality and 
high rates of unemployment. This suggests that either Botswana is doing 
something that Nigeria is not or Nigeria is doing something it should not be 
doing. The motivation for this research emerged from a genuine curiosity 
about what this ‘something’ is and with the finding of oil in Ghana, it is 
important to ask the question: “Is the mere presence of some natural 
resource or other sufficient to improve the lives of people in a country or do 
other factors come into play?” 
Both countries discovered their natural resources while still under colonial 
rule. However, considering the fact that as compared to Nigeria, Botswana 
enjoyed relative political stability after independence, it will be interesting to 
determine whether media freedom and democracy have a direct or indirect 
effect on the management and distribution of resources since they foster 
political stability.  
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
It is evident that the presence of natural resources in a country and their 
effective management go a long way to improving the lives of the people in 
the country. The finding of oil in Ghana by Tullow Oil in June 2007 off Cape 
Three Points has caused a lot of buzz in the Ghanaian media and a lot of 
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people are looking forward to the expected revenue that is estimated to be 
billions of pounds (Rice, 2007). This will finally give government the revenue 
it so desperately needs to improve the lives of Ghanaians by providing 
infrastructure and social amenities like good roads, hospitals and clinics, 
schools and quality teaching materials.  
However there is ambiguity in the literature about the actual effect of 
resource wealth on the growth and development of a country. Unlike Nigeria, 
Ghana found oil after many years of democratic rule although Ghana’s 
economic and political experience is close to Nigeria’s. Unlike Botswana which 
is more homogenous in terms of tribal composition, Ghana has many tribes. 
Further, unlike Botswana, Ghana established media freedom before finding 
oil. However like Botswana, Ghana was democratic before oil as a natural 
resource became a big player in the economy. The research problem here 
concerns how well (or not) Ghana’s economy will perform having found oil 
and in particular whether that performance will be closer to Nigeria’s 
performance or Botswana’s. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Considering the cases of both Nigeria and Botswana, Ghana’s oil find has 
equal chances of going either way. It is crucial that in these beginning stages 
a path be chosen, and the right one at that, in order for there not to be any 
regrets in the future. 
The research questions for this paper are: 
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1. How did the policies that the government of Botswana implemented 
make a difference in terms of development? 
2. How did the policies that the government of Nigeria implemented 
make a difference in terms of development? 
3. How will these serve as guidelines to the government of Ghana’s own 
policies? 
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The goals of this paper are: 
1. To make a comparative analysis of Nigeria and Botswana’s policy 
making and restructuring processes after the finding of their respective 
natural resources and the effect this had on economic growth and 
development. 
2. To find out what policies have been put in place in Ghana since the oil 
find. 
3. To make some recommendations to the Ghanaian government based 
on the comparison, on how to effectively utilize the oil find to the 
benefit of the whole country. 
1.7 RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH 
1. Since the oil find in Ghana is fairly new, there is a gap in literature 
addressing the effect of policies put in place to effectively manage the 
revenue from this resource. 
2.  Revenue from oil may be of little use if Ghana does not position itself 
to maximize gains. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
With regards to the reasons as to why resource-poor countries do 
economically better than resource-rich countries, existing literature is almost 
entirely consistent in its contention that the main reason is the lack of quality 
institutions in these resource-rich countries. In their 2010 article entitled 
Why are natural resources a curse in Africa, but not elsewhere?, Carmignani 
and Chowdhury (2010) tested the relationship between natural resources and 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by studying the dependence on natural 
resources by SSA countries and its effect on GDP levels from 1960 to 2008. 
They found that in the almost 50 year period, SSA’s GDP grew by an average 
annual rate of 0.74% while the proportion of natural resource export to total 
goods export declined minimally from 77% to 65.1% (Carmignani and 
Chowdhury, 2010). They therefore conclude that natural resources are not a 
curse in themselves but are dependent on some other conditions existing in 
the economy.  
According to Sachs and Warner (1997), the unusual occurrence that we see 
today of resource-poor countries outperforming rich countries is not a new 
one. They claim that in the 17th century, the Netherlands outdid Spain in 
terms of economic development despite Spain’s wealth in silver and gold, in 
the 19th century, Switzerland and Japan surpassed resource-rich Russia and 
even more recently it is obvious that the Newly Industrializing Economies 
(NIEs) of East Asia- Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore- are far outshining the 
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oil-rich countries of Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela (Sachs and Warner, 
1997). Why is this so?  
To fully answer this question, the literature reviewed will provide knowledge 
on the link between natural resource abundance and economic growth, that 
is, the effects that the presence of natural resources have on the economic 
growth and development of a country. Lastly, literature will also be reviewed 
on the concept of institutions and their importance in an economy. 
2.2 THE EFFECT OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
In their paper entitled Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, 
Sachs and Warner (1997) address the issue of the negative relationship 
between resource abundance and growth. According to Sachs and Warner 
(1999) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) (as cited in Iimi, 2006), it is 
natural to expect that resource abundance should increase investments in an 
economy and hence, raise its growth rates. Sachs and Warner (1997) give an 
example of Britain, Germany and the U.S. in the late nineteenth century who 
used their abundance in coal and iron ore to build local steel industries that 
contributed to their quick industrial development. Chenery and Strout (1966) 
made the argument about the growth-stimulating power of resource wealth 
in an early paper in 1966 where they discussed the 2-gap model.  According 
to their argument, resource poor countries need two factors to grow; savings 
and foreign exchange.  These two factors (or gaps) can be provided by 
resource wealth or foreign aid so resource wealth is not inherently bad. 
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However, as Sachs and Warner (1997) show, from cross-country growth 
equations, that there was an inverse relationship between natural resource 
abundance and growth from 1970 to 1990 from a sample of 95 developing 
countries. Iimi (2006) holds similar views on this negative relationship 
between resource abundance and economic growth. In his paper, Did 
Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse?, Iimi (2006) agrees that the 
resource curse idea is a common one. He however cites Botswana as another 
example of a country that seems to be doing the opposite with an average 
growth rate of 7.8% since the 1980s that can be attributed to its abundance 
in diamonds. 
From Sachs and Warner’s (1997) findings they concluded that even though 
economies were booming in the 1970s and conditions were favorable for 
primary producers, countries rich in primary resources still grew slower than 
other countries. From their sample of 95 countries, they found only 2 
countries – Malaysia and Mauritius – which had an abundance of natural 
resources but still maintained a high average per capita growth. This, they 
attributed to the fact that both countries encouraged open trade which drove 
their labour-intensive manufacturing exports. Their high levels of growth 
therefore came about because instead of basing their economies on their 
natural resources, they rather supported their manufacturing industries.  
Iimi (2006) uses the linear growth regression model to find out the 
relationship between abundance in natural resources and governance and 
their combined effect on economic growth. Governance here comprises of 
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accountability, the effectiveness and efficiency of government and 
anticorruption policies (ibid). Iimi (2006) found that in the short-run 
governance does not have a significant impact on growth. However in the 
very-long run, when natural resources are brought into the equation, 
governance has a hand in transforming resource abundance into economic 
growth and development. He therefore concludes that having an abundance 
of natural resources alone does not automatically result in growth but with 
the addition of effective management of resources by government this 
growth can be realized. 
Gylfason, in his 2001 paper Natural Resources and Economic Growth: What 
is the Connection?, pointed out that from 1970 to 1998, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Botswana were the 4 resource-rich countries out of 65 that 
were able to obtain high average rates of GDP and GNP per capita growth. 
The 3 Asian countries - Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand – did this by 
industrializing while Botswana did not. Iimi (2006) explains that Botswana’s 
success can be attributed to its good governance and reliable institutions, 
especially in the area of private property.   
Sachs and Warner (1997) also look into the issue of the quality of 
institutions, their effect on investment and hence, growth. They began by 
saying that there is an almost direct relationship between rule of law and the 
quality of institutions. Sachs and Warner (1997) therefore considered rule of 
law to represent the efficiency of institutions in a legal and political 
framework. They concluded that the quality of institutions in a country is 
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directly related to growth while resource abundant countries tend to have 
lower quality institutions. 
2.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
According to North and Thomas (1973) as cited by Acemoglu et al. (2004), 
contrary to traditional neoclassical growth models, the fundamental cause for 
the difference in economic growth and development among countries is the 
difference in institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2004) define good economic 
institutions as those that allow people to own property and also, provide 
equal access to economic resources to a majority of the people.  
North (1990) defines institutions (cited in Acemoglu et al. 2004, p. 1) as “… 
the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction.” The paper by Acemoglu et al. 
(2004) goes on to describe economic institutions as decisions like property 
rights and the presence of markets that determine economic outcomes. 
Economic institutions are important because they determine how resources 
are efficiently allocated. Individuals with no rights to property are not 
motivated to invest in human or physical assets which lead to these 
resources becoming redundant because their full potential is not taken 
advantage of. Also, when markets are absent or overlooked, more often than 
not, gains from trade are wasted and resources are not distributed fairly. 
Therefore, in order for a society to grow, it needs to encourage innovation 
and the efficient allocation of resources through its institutions. 
Consequently, differences in economic institutions are the major reason why 
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countries have different levels of economic growth and prosperity (Acemoglu 
et al. 2004). 
To support this claim, Acemoglu et al. (2004) undertook a number of 
experiments: 
1. The Korean Experiment: This experiment aimed to contrast and 
compare North and South Korea on the basis of their equality in all 
aspects (culture, geography and history) except the quality of their 
institutions. While the North adopted the ideologies of the socialists by 
putting an end to property rights, the South encouraged free markets 
and the ownership of property. By 2000, South Korea had transformed 
into one of the world’s leading economies with a level of income of $ 
16,100 while North Korea’s growth rate declined with an income level 
of $1,000. 
2. The Colonial Experiment – The Reversal of Fortune: This experiment 
focused on the effect that European influence had on institutions in 
many different countries. The Europeans imposed very different 
institutions in these countries, evidenced by the different institutions 
that can be found in places like North-East America and the Caribbean. 
However, the Indians who were one of the richest people in 1500 are 
now one of the poorest while the poorer North Americans and 
Australians are now among the richest. Acemoglu et al. (2004) 
realized that it was common for densely populated areas to have bad 
institutions because their European colonizers did not respect the 
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property rights of the majority while in sparsely populated areas where 
the Europeans settled themselves, it was in their interest to establish 
good institutions. Therefore, the “reversal of fortune”, according to 
Acemoglu et al. (2004), was due largely to the differences in the 
quality of institutions.  
Mehlum et al. (2006) hold similar views on the importance of quality 
institutions in an economy. In their article, Institutions and the Resource 
Curse, Mehlum et al. (2006) plotted 2 graphs: one with the average yearly 
economic growth from 1965 to 1990 on one axis with countries with bad 
institutions that have their resource exports contributing more than 10% to 
their GDP on the other axis. The second graph had the average yearly 
economic growth from 1965 to 1990 on one axis with countries with good 
institutions that have their resource exports contributing more than 10% to 
their GDP on the other axis. They found out that there was evidence of a 
resource curse in countries with bad institutions while the opposite was true 
for countries with good institutions. They describe good institutions as 
producer friendly institutions which use resources to raise income and bad 
institutions as grabber friendly institutions that, in spite of natural resources, 
have a low level of aggregate income. Producer and grabber friendly 
institutions are defined based on indices from Political Risk Services – “a rule 
of law index, a bureaucratic quality index, a corruption in government index, 
a risk of expropriation index and a government repudiation of contracts 
index” (Mehlum et al. 2006, p. 13) with the index running from one (high) to 
zero (low). Mehlum et al. (2006) go further to cite Botswana as an example 
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of a resource-rich country whose good institutions (evident in its good score 
on the Gronigen Corruption Perception Index) has resulted in the country 
having one of the world’s highest growth rates. They therefore conclude that 
economies with producer friendly institutions invariably do much better than 
economies with grabber friendly institutions. 
I test this theory building on Sachs and Warner’s influential works on the 
resource curse. My main hypothesis – that institutions are decisive for the 
resource curse – is confirmed. My results agree with the claims of Sachs and 
Warner that the quality of institutions in a country does have an effect on the 
growth of that country. 
2.4 INSTITUTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
In their 2010 article Why are natural resources a curse in Africa, but not 
elsewhere? Carmignani and Chowdhury explore the subject of the resource 
curse and conclude that this curse applies only to sub-Saharan Africa and not 
anywhere else and this is due to the relationship between institutions and 
natural resources. 
Research by Carmignani and Chowdhury (2010) shows that between 1960 
and 1980, the ratio of natural resource exports to total exports in sub-
Saharan Africa declined insignificantly by 11.9% from 77% to 65.1% while 
the average annual growth rate for GDP per capita was a dismal 0.74%. They 
explain that recent research has gone a long way to show that a major 
reason why a high dependence on natural resources does not lead to 
economic growth and development is that, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
33 
 
there is a weakness in institutions, the management of resources and 
consequently, a deficiency in the quality of education and health and public 
infrastructures. Hence, Carmignani and Chowdhury’s (2010, p. 4) argument 
is that ‘natural resources are not a curse per-se, but rather they are curse 
depending on some other initial conditions of the economy’, and these 
conditions are, for the most part, the institutional development of the 
economy. Mehlum et al. (2006), Snyder (2006) and Boschini et al. (2007) 
(cited in Carmignani and Chowdhury, 2010) all hold similar views on this 
issue and state that the effect of natural resources on growth is dependent 
on the quality of basic institutions. 
Carmignani and Chowdhury (2010) use a standard growth regression to 
understand why the natural resource curse is specific to SSA.8 Using a 
sample of 109 countries, Carmignani and Chowdhury (2010) concluded that 
even though it will be easy to assume that the negative relationship between 
the presence of natural resources and economic growth is caused by the 
countries’ dependence on resources that are not conducive for growth, the 
fact is only a few of the resources are not conducive for growth. Therefore, 
                                                             
8 The table below compares the 5 largest non-African oil producing countries and their GDP per capita in 
2009 with the GDP per capita in 2009 of the 5 largest oil-producing Africa countries to determine whether 
the resource curse is indeed specific to Africa: 
African Country GDP per capita (current 
prices) 
Non-African Country GDP per capita (current 
prices) 
Algeria US$ 3,925.92 United States US$ 45,934.47 
Angola US$ 4,081.98 Russia US$ 8, 614.03 
Libya US$ 9,371.31 Saudi Arabia US$ 14,744.61 
Nigeria US$ 1,111.75 China US$ 3,738.95 
Egypt US$ 2,455.83 Iran US$ 4,334.13 
(Source: Economy Watch, 2011) 
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the key to understanding the negative relationship is understanding the 
relationship between institutions and natural resources.  
2.5 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE 
In general, the literature on natural resources, institutions and economic 
growth suggest that the resource curse will be a thing of the past as long as 
countries invest in institutions that will promote property rights and equality 
before the law. This will give everybody an equal opportunity in society and 
therefore serve as an incentive for them to work harder to improve their 
lives. 
It is pertinent to note also that although institutions have been accounted in 
a broad sense in the resource curse debate, the role of media freedom and 
its consequence for increasing transparency in a resource rich country has 
been largely ignored.  Since Armah and Amoah (2010) find that media 
freedom reduces corruption and fosters political stability, an interesting line 
of enquiry is how media freedom will affect the resource curse debate 
especially in Ghana which enjoys media freedom.  
 Further, despite the recent oil find in Ghana, available literature provides 
little information on the quality of institutions in Ghana to manage this 
resource. The objective of this research is to fill in the gap in the literature on 
the policies that have been put in place since the oil find and determine 
whether their implementation will result in the economic growth and 
development that is so needed. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the research tools and methods of data collection used 
for this study. It explains the data collection methods used and the data 
sources. The primary objective of this study is to learn from the policies that 
Nigeria and Botswana used to manage their resource wealth, and determine 
and evaluate what policies the government of Ghana has put in place to 
prevent Ghana from experiencing the resource curse with its oil find. The 
major institution responsible for this is the national oil company, the Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). 
3.2 DATA AND METHODS 
1. Scope: This study focuses on natural resources in Nigeria, Botswana 
and Ghana and the scope of the data considered ranged from the year 
the resources were discovered in the respective countries to date. 
Data on Ghana was from 2010 after extraction of oil first began, on 
Nigeria from 1956 after the first oil find and on Botswana from the 
early 1990s after the first major incidences of corruption. 
2. Data collection: Qualitative techniques through interviews and the 
analysis of secondary data obtained from GNPC was the principal 
method of analysis employed. GNPC is the only institution that is 
authorized to monitor the collection and distribution of petroleum 




3. Sampling Techniques: The purposive sampling technique was used 
because considering the topic, it was decided that key authorities on 
oil and governmental policies would have the knowledge and expertise 
to provide required information. Mr. Sam Addo Nortey, a principal 
auditor at GNPC was recommended. He provided a breakdown of the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act (Act 815), the framework passed 
by Parliament for the collection and distribution of petroleum revenue. 
In order to get first hand information on Nigeria that will either support 
or challenge secondary data reviewed, two Nigerian students from 
Ashesi University College, Ms. Osarieme Thelma Osagie-Erese and Mr. 
Adesanya Oluwatomi Ayomide, were interviewed. 
Secondary data played an important role in the study because it 
provides already existing data on the structural policies of Botswana, 
Nigeria and Ghana and their effects on their respective economies. 
Sources of secondary data were Internet sources, Journals and the 
budget statements of all three countries.  
4. Data Collection: Considering the nature of the topic, I decided to use 
unstructured interviews because they allowed me to use open-ended 
questions whose wording I could change at will. This made the 
interviews flexible and allowed me to probe into exactly what the 
government is doing and the concept behind the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act.  
5. Data Analysis Techniques: The analysis of the interviews was 
descriptive in nature and was used to find out if they agreed with my 
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findings from the secondary data. Findings from the interviews and 
secondary data were used to make suggestions and recommendations 
to the Ghanaian government on what to do to end up like Botswana 
not Nigeria. 
6. Limitations of Research:  
a. There was a high possibility that the interviewee would be biased 
towards the government since he is employed in a state-owned 
institution.  
b. Some data requested were marked as confidential.  

















CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF PROJECT RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION OF 
RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings from data collected. The 
first section addresses the question, “what policies did the governments of 
Botswana and Nigeria implement to ensure the equitable distribution of 
resource revenue and growth and development” was answered with a focus 
on corruption. The second section gives an overview of the policies the 
government of Ghana has implemented or is planning to implement in 
relation to the oil being extracted off Cape Three points in the South-Western 
part of the country. 
Stapenhurst and Sedigh (1999) (as cited by Gbadamosi 2005) define 
corruption as ‘the abuse of power, most often for personal gain or for the 
benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance’. Gbadamosi (2005) states 
that the problem of corruption has been oversimplified to mean financial 
exchanges between persons for favours. He however clarifies this by adding 
that it includes: 
the issues of exchange of gifts, requests for loans, conflict of interest, misuse of 
position by abusing ones office including: misusing confidential information, 
government property, and official time among others. (Gbadamosi 2005, p. 4) 
Todaro and Smith (2006) highlight on corruption by explaining that its 
removal is key to development because it increases the rate of investment 
and consequently, boosts the growth of the economy. Gbadamosi agrees 
39 
 
with this view in his 2005 paper Corruption Perception and Sustainable 
Development: Sharing Botswana’s Anti-Graft Agency Experiences. According 
to him, good governance and transparency are essential in Africa to break 
the vicious cycle of poverty and the way to do this is to create a state free of 
mismanagement. 
4.2 BOTSWANA AND CORRUPTION 
Three Presidential Commissions of Inquiry, two in 1991 and one in 1992, 
uncovered major cases of corruption in the Botswana government. In the 
first case, laid down procedures for the supply of textbooks to primary 
schools were not followed and this resulted in the loss of P27 million (US$15 
million at the time) to the state. In the second case, some Cabinet Ministers 
were found to be involved in unfair distribution of land. In the third case, the 
CEO of the government institution, Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC), 
was found to have embezzled the organization’s funds (Gbadamosi, 2005). 
Good (1994) describes corruption in Botswana as restricted to the elite and 
not an epidemic as is the case in Nigeria. Good (1994) however blames the 
corruption on the country’s rapid growth which has intensified the 
inequalities in the distribution of property and income. He warns that 
corruption in Botswana might get out of hand if strict steps are not taken to 
improve morality and discipline the leadership of the country. 
The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), modeled after 
Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), was 
therefore established in 1994 to focus on the eradication of poverty through 
40 
 
public education, corruption prevention and detailed investigation for both 
the public and private sector. Botswana’s impressive ranking as the least 
corrupt country in Africa from 2001 to 2004 is as a result of the efforts of the 
DCEC to, among other things, improve citizens’ knowledge on the 
consequences of corruption and prevent corruption in government agencies 
by performing external audits (Gbadamosi, 2005). 
4.2.1 THE GOVERNMENT OF BOTSWANA AND POLICIES 
REGARDING THE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCE RENTS 
Atsushi Iimi’s 2006 paper Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse? 
seeks to discover how Botswana transformed its diamond wealth into 
economic growth and development that is unmatched by any other African 
resource rich country. According to him, the extent to which resource wealth 
can produce results is determined by the quality of governance in the 
country. He mentions that in developing countries the quality of governance 
is assessed by policies to combat corruption especially in the public sector 
and how often regulations are changed in the country. 
Larry Diamond (as cited in Good 1994) described Botswana as an exceptional 
country whose leadership, made up of elite who restricted their interference 
in the economy, led to a low level of mismanagement and corruption and the 
creation of effective institutions. In his 2008 paper, Policy and Institutional 
Dynamics of Sustained Growth in Botswana, Maipose explains that 
Botswana’s ready acceptance of foreign aid helped to finance a lot of 
investment in infrastructure and the mining sector. He goes on to say that 
41 
 
domestic savings also went a long way to build infrastructure and develop 
human resource. Stevens (2003) explains that revenue from diamonds was 
used on mainly social services, that is, physical and social infrastructure. 
Also, an incomes policy was introduced to prevent among other things, 
prevent extreme income disparities (Stevens, 2003). Botswana’s leadership 
understood that their reliance on one or two natural resources as their 
primary source of revenue left them vulnerable to recessions in the economy. 
They therefore set up the Domestic Development Fund (DDF) to serve as a 
reserve for future projects, payment of debts, lend to public companies and 
initial funding for private businesses. The government also used the Fund to 
diversify the economy and invest in the non-mineral sector (Maipose, 2008). 
Stevens (2003) described these actions as an attempt by the government to 
consciously restrict its spending in the abundance of diamond revenue but 
also encourage private investment and encourage market-driven sustainable 
development. 
The Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS), a database 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) (as cited by Iimi 2006), 
shows that Botswana has experienced a relatively good level of governance 
in terms of freedoms in the political process and political rights, the 
effectiveness of the government in the performance of public duties, 
relationships with private industries in the mining sector and the 
establishment of anticorruption policies. Concentration on these aspects of 
governance ensures that those in charge of resource extraction are held 
accountable for their actions, resource rents are not overexploited, 
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government has control over private companies involved in resource 
extraction in the country and finally, activities are conducted in a fair and 
transparent manner.  
4.3 NIGERIA AND CORRUPTION 
Sam A. Aluko, at a lecture at the Centre for Democratic Development 
Research and Training, points out that after comparing corruption indices 
from Transparency International and the Human Development Index from 
1998 to 2006, it is evident that there is a relationship between income, 
human development and corruption, that is, low income leads to low human 
development and a high level of corruption. This is means that a country has 
to improve in income and human development for corruption to decrease 
(Aluko, 2008). 
In spite of Nigeria’s size and resource endowment, it has failed to reach its 
full potential. Gosztonyi et al. (2009) attribute this to poor leadership, weak 
infrastructure and high levels of corruption which prevents foreign 
investment. They also blame the mindset of most Nigerians that government 
officials themselves satisfy their personal interests with government funds so 
there is nothing wrong with offering bribes for personal favours. 
To deal with this endemic, the Nigerian government set up the Independent 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2000 
and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2004. 
However, there are doubts as to the EFCC’s integrity and ability to withstand 
control by those in power. It is rumoured that former president Olusegun 
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Obasanjo used the EFCC to disqualify some of his opponents before the April 
2007 elections (Gosztonyi et al., 2009) 
4.3.1 THE GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA AND POLICIES 
REGARDING THE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCE RENTS 
Agba and Obi (2006) explain that at independence, when the main source of 
Nigeria’s foreign exchange was agricultural produce, the country operated a 
system where revenue was shared by derivation9 for even development 
across the country and with minimum government interference. However, 
they point out that after the discovery of crude oil and extraction started in 
the Niger Delta in 1956, changes in revenue sharing led Nigeria from oil 
boom to oil doom. 
Iledare and Suberu (2010) explain that the constitution of the First Republic 
made both offshore and onshore petroleum resources subject to the 
derivation principle but a 1970 military decree limited its application to 
onshore resources and this has been upheld even by the current 1999 
Constitution. Requests and protests by the Niger Delta states for the 
application of the derivation rule to offshore resources led to the enactment 
of the “Allocation of Revenue Act of 2004”. This stated that ‘two hundred 
meter water depth Isobaths’ adjacent to the states will be included in the 
derivation principle. The Act was however challenged by 22 of the non-oil 
producing states but the Supreme Court argued that the Act was in line with 
                                                             
9 Derivation is a principle whereby a particular percentage of rents and royalties are retained by the 
regions where extraction or production occurred (Barkan and Gboyega, 2001).  
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the duties and responsibilities of the National Assembly (Iledare and Suberu, 
2010). 
After years of over-centralization under military rule, Nigerians are still not 
satisfied by the efforts of the ruling civilian government. This is because the 
country is experiencing considerable political and electoral corruption, the 
revolution in the Niger Delta and the uproar by the Southern states who want 
natural resource control to be decentralized (Iledare and Suberu, 2010).  
Fiscal federalism calls for resources in a country to be distributed equitably 
through the competent functions of those in authority (Ndebio, 2004; Sharp 
and Olsen, 1978) (as cited by Agba and Obi, 2006). However, in their 2006 
paper titled Oil Rent Management and Fiscal Federalism: The Nigerian 
Experience, Agba and Obi discuss how Nigerian fiscal policy with regards to 
management of oil rents has been modified to suit the elites who belong to 
ethnic groups who have control of the government. There are three separate 
levels of government in Nigeria: the Federal Government, the State 
Governments and the Local Government units. Agba and Obi (2006) explain 
that Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution as per Section 162, Subsection 1 and 2, 
describes how financial resources are to be allocated so that the different 
levels of government can perform their functions. However, Agba and Obi 
(2006) point out that as a result of federalism, the State and Local 
Governments have become subordinates of the Federal Government and they 
find it difficult to perform their constitutional functions. Oil by law is owned 
by the Federal Government of Nigeria and this means that its sources of 
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revenue include mining royalties, import and excise duties and company 
income tax (Agba and Obi, 2006; Iledare and Suberu, 2010). However, the 
average financial autonomy ratio10 for Nigeria between 1993 and 2004 was 
170.95% for the Federal Government, 17.12% for the State Governments 
and 6.6% for the Local Governments. This shows that the Federal 
Government had much more than it needed and this can be linked to 
wasteful spending, corruption in the government and lack of fairness and 
transparency in government activities (Agba and Obi, 2006).  
The interviews conducted with Ms. Osagie-Erese and Mr. Ayomide revealed 
that even though the Nigerian government publicizes information on the 
collection and use of petroleum revenue in the annual national budgets, it is 
very rarely that actual development projects are completed or even started. 
They also explained that the recent national strikes on fuel subsidies that 
happened in December of 2011 can be attributed to corruption in the 
petroleum sector since Nigerians are supposed to be enjoying subsidies as 
producers of oil. 
4.4 GHANA AND CORRUPTION 
In Ghana, the constitution gives the President the power to fire the head of 
every public organization as soon as he gets into office. The constitution is 
regarded as inefficient especially with regards to the President being able to 
influence the actions of the Judiciary since he appoints the Superior Court 
judges (Mondo, 2011). With regards to the oil industry, the Board of 
                                                             




Directors of the GNPC is appointed by the government which also supervises 
the Corporation’s activities (Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, n.d.). 
Dismissals and appointments of government officials have been politicized 
with new governments replacing boards of institutions such as the Ghana 
Commercial Bank, while appointments of local assembly members and 
district chief executives are the responsibility of the sitting President 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 2010) (as cited by Mondo, 2011). Such inefficiencies were 
addressed by the Constitutional Review Commission which was inaugurated 
in 2010 by current President, Mr. John Evans Atta Mills. In a final report to 
the President on December 21, 2011, the Chairman of the Commission, Prof. 
(Emeritus) Albert Kodzo Fiadjoe, stated that after using a ‘highly 
participatory qualitative inquiry methodology’, it has been recommended that 
the appointment power of the President should be limited by requiring him to 
make more consultations before making an appointment (Constitution 
Review Commission, 2011).   
In order to combat corruption, the Whistleblower Act was passed in 2006, 
Ghana joined the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 
2007. Ghana’s central Anti-Corruption Agency is the Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice. Even though it is considered to function 
independently, it has no authority to prosecute which is a major restriction to 
its authority. Other institutions which deal with transparency are the Audit 
Service and the Economic and Organized Crimes Office. The responsibilities 
of the Attorney-General include being head of the prosecution service and 
chief legal advisor to the President, as well as having the authority to start or 
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end prosecutions at any time without explanation (ibid, 2011). However, 
considering the fact that the Attorney-General can be fired and hired by the 
President and is therefore obliged to the President, this serves as another 
hindrance to independent and objective prosecution. 
4.5 THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA AND POLICIES REGARDING THE 
MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCE  RENTS 
In spite of the fact that oil was discovered in Ghana in 2007, extraction did 
not begin until 2010 because the Jubilee field had to be appraised by Messrs 
KOSMOS Energy and Tullow Oil Ghana Limited (Ghana Budget, 2009). 
According to Dr. Kwabena Duffour, the Minister of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MoFEP), if the oil and gas resources are not managed 
properly, the wealth that all Ghanaians hope for will remain a dream (Ghana 
Budget, 2010). MoFEP plans to make sure that ‘Ghana benefits, to the 
greatest extent possible, from discovery and production of oil and gas’ 
(Ghana Budget, 2009). 
According to the 2010 Ghana Budget, some of the plans that the government 
had regarding oil and gas included: 
1. Starting oil production in the Jubilee field while appraising fields in the 
Deep Water Tano and West Cape Three Points Areas for possible oil 
fields. 




3. Developing the skills of locals to ensure their participation in 
development activities in the area. 
4. Improving infrastructure for communities near the oil fields. 
5. Developing Environmental Protection plans to protect the eco-system. 
6. Ensuring a transparent and accountable Government. 
Considering the fact that as at the last quarter of 2011 Ghana was enjoying a 
13.6% growth rate, 8.4% inflation rate, interest rates of 9.1%, for the first 
time Ghana could boast of meeting all the four primary convergence criteria 
for the West African Monetary Zone programme and the well-being of 
Ghanaians have improved considerably, it seems that the policies the 
Ghanaian government have put in place are working for the benefit of all 
involved. 
Regarding the oil and gas industry and revenues from it, the Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Law has been amended to encourage investment 
by making the process of obtaining production licenses less complicated and 
stressful for domestic and international investors (Zaney, 2011). 
The government has also begun a hedging programme to protect oil revenue 
from fluctuations in oil prices on the world market (Ghana Budget, 2012). 
In line with their promise for transparent and fair management of revenues 
from the oil and gas industry, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (Act 




4.6 THE PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT ACT, 2011 (ACT 815) 
 The PRMA was formed after intensive consultation with and requests for 
comments from the public and Civil Society Organizations before being 
presented for approval from Parliament. The PRMA was also based on 
experiences from around the world to ensure a solid legal basis for the 
effective and efficient utilization of petroleum revenues in Ghana. It is a 
framework for the ‘collection, allocation and management of petroleum 
revenue in a responsible, transparent, accountable and sustainable manner’ 
for the improvement of the lives of all Ghanaians (Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act, 2011). 
As per the PRMA, a public fund, the Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF) has been 
established at the Bank of Ghana (BoG) to receive all petroleum revenue and 
distribute it by the authority of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). To show 
transparency and accountability, data on petroleum receipts are to be 
published by the Minister of Finance in the Gazette, at least two state-owned 
daily newspapers and the website of MoFEP before presentation to 
Parliament.  
The Ghana Stabilization Fund and the Ghana Heritage Fund (together known 
as the Ghana Petroleum Fund), have also been established. The purpose of 
the Stabilization Fund is to, during unforeseen shortfalls in petroleum 
revenue, sustain public expenditure capacity while the Heritage Fund is to 
serve as support for development projects for future generations after 
petroleum revenue reserves have been exhausted. 
50 
 
As part of his duties, the Minister of Finance is to prioritize 4 areas every 3 
years for the use of the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA). These areas, 
according to the Act, are: 
1. agriculture and industry; 
2.  physical infrastructure and service delivery in education, science and 
technology; 
3. potable water delivery and sanitation; 
4. infrastructure development in telecommunication, road, rail and port; 
5. physical infrastructure and service delivery in health; 
6. housing delivery; 
7. environmental protection, sustainable utilization and the protection of 
natural resources; 
8. rural development; 
9. developing alternative energy sources; 
10. the strengthening of institutions of government concerned with 
governance and the maintenance of law and order; 
11.public safety and security; and 
12. the provision of social welfare and the protection of the physically 




This year the ABFA is 70% of the Benchmark Revenue11 and the 4 prioritized 
areas for 2012, according to the 2012 budget are: 
1. pay back of loans for oil and gas infrastructure 
2. road and other infrastructure 
3. modernization of the agricultural sector  
4. capacity building (including oil and gas) 
The Minister, with the help of the Investment Advisory Committee (IAC), is 
to develop an investment policy for the Ghana Petroleum Fund which shall be 
reported by the BoG to Parliament and published on the Bank’s website and 
two state-owned daily newspapers. 
Internal and external audits shall be conducted by the Internal Audit 
Department of the BoG and the Auditor-General which shall be published and 
submitted to Parliament. 
A Public Interest and Accountability Committee has also been established to 
monitor and independently evaluate the government and relevant institutions 
to ensure that they are following the provisions of the Act in terms of the 
management and use of petroleum revenue and provide the public with the 
opportunity to make their views known on the management and use of 
petroleum revenue.  
                                                             
11 For each financial year the Benchmark Revenue = Expected current receipts from oil + Expected gas 




Finally, the government decided to intensify the fiscal decentralization 
process and transfer the responsibility and authority of allocation of 
resources to local authorities as a way of encouraging grassroot participation 
in the decision making processes (Ghana Budget, 2012). 
4.7 SUMMARY 
The general argument is that in order to deal with corruption in the public 
sector, government should focus on constant structural adjustment while 
concentrating on improving governance. However, it is evident from the 
cases of both Botswana and Nigeria that strategies and policies that deal with 
corruption, fairness and transparency must be tailored to suit the economic, 
legal, social and political contexts in which they are found (Doig and Riley, 
1998). 
Generally, Botswana’s homogenous tribal composition leads its government 
to centralize when it comes to resource revenue control.  The central 
government has the power to implement fiscal policies and arrange the 
equitable distribution of revenue among the different regions (Iimi, 2006). 
Also, the government has established a transparent, independent agency to 
increase accountability in the management of natural resources in the 
country (Doig and Riley, 1998). 
With Nigeria’s more tribalistic nature and its constant problem of lack of 
transparency, and bad governance, it is evident that federalism is not 
producing results. The government has to decentralize and transfer its 
administrative powers to local bodies to govern themselves (Agba and Obi, 
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2006). This also has the advantage of encouraging grassroots participation 
and building a democratic nation (Olken, 2007).   
It is evident with the passing of the PRMA that the government of Ghana is 
doing all it can to ensure the fair and transparent collection and utilization of 
petroleum revenue. Currently, the government is in control of the collection 
and distribution of petroleum revenue but is however making efforts to 




















Chapter 5: Recommendations and Conclusions 
At a conference in Ghana in November 2011, Professor Yinka Omorogbe of 
the Department of Public and International Law at the University of Ibadan, 
Nigeria stated that in order to avoid the resource curse, Ghana has to, 
among other things, build the right basis for industry by enforcing laws and 
regulations that are in line with national policies, transparency and good 
governance and develop institutions that are willing and capable of enforcing 
laws (Omorogbe, 2011). 
Mr. Addo Nortey explained that good, strong policies are the underlying 
factor that is needed to transform a country’s vision for its resources into 
socio-economic development. However, in order for these policies not to 
remain as idle philosophy they have to be ‘operationalized’ through a 
legislative framework which will be implemented through regulations by 
institutions (Nortey, 2011). In effect, the PRMA came about as a result of a 
National Policy Agenda for Shared Growth and Accelerated Development for a 
Better Ghana, Oil and Gas Policy, Oil Laws like the PRMA and the Petroleum 
Commission Act after which petroleum management institutions were then 
established (Omorogbe, 2011). It is the problems of the absence of 
regulations and/or weak institutions that have caused many resource 
endowed countries to encounter implementation challenges (Nortey, 2011). 
5.1RECOMMENDATIONS 
After extensive research it is evident that a lot is being done by the Ghanaian 
government to ensure that revenue from the oil and gas industry is 
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distributed equitably for the benefit of all Ghanaians. However there are still 
steps that have to be taken to ensure that distribution is done in a fair 
manner: 
According to Adam (2011), the 2012 Budget Statement shows that there are 
discrepancies in oil receipts for 2011. He points out that the government 
predicted GH¢600 million as oil revenue from corporate taxes. However, 
according to the 2012 Budget Statement, they actually received GH¢ 506 
million. He attributes this to the non-payment of corporate taxes by oil 
companies (Adam, 2011). It is important for the government to not be too 
enthusiastic and rush into relationships with private-resource developing 
companies. Strict regulations have to be designed and enforced to ensure 
that the activities of these companies fall within the requirements of the 
government. 
The 2012 Budget Statement shows the regional distribution of oil revenue for 
2011. Even though the revenue was not equally distributed among the 
different regions, the Western region was allocated 10% of the ABFA as per 
the demands of the chiefs and people of the region (Adam, 2011). In order 
to avoid the riots which are so prevalent in the oil-producing regions of 
Nigeria, the government has to ensure that there is a fair framework by 
which oil revenue is allocated among the regions. The justification for this 
framework should be made public to ensure that all stakeholders understand 
it to prevent confusion in the future. 
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In order to ensure that Ghanaians are benefitting from petroleum revenues, 
it is advisable that the government keep an eye on development indicators 
like HDI instead of on rates of economic growth and GDP which can be 
misleading and disguise high levels of inequality and suffering. 
Gbadamosi (2005) explains how the media played a major role in helping the 
DCEC to reduce corruption in state-owned corporations. According to him, 
the print media encouraged the public to report any incidences of corruption 
and these leads were followed with enough publicity to serve as a deterrent 
to other public officials. Considering the fact that Ghana enjoys more media 
freedom than both Nigeria and Botswana, it is essential that the powers of 
the media be strengthened and taken advantage of to help expose the 
corruption that typically turns oil blessings into curses.   
The government’s plan to decentralize the revenue distribution process to 
encourage grassroot participation may not have the desired end result. As 
Acosta and Heuty (2009) point out, the practice of sharing revenue from the 
mining sector has not yielded visible optimistic outcomes. It might therefore 
be better to keep this distribution power in the hands of the central 
government while strengthening institutions and encouraging citizen 
participation so that they can demand accountability from the government. 
However, in order for all these to work out, it is essential for institutions to 
be given a firm structure to make and implement regulations efficiently and 
effectively. This can be done through the provision of a strong 
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administrative, technical, financial, legal, business and advisory capacity 
(Nortey, 2012).  
5.2CONCLUSION 
The aim of the research was to find out the importance of governmental 
policies on the management of revenue from natural resources. Literature 
reviewed showed that there is a relationship between the quality of 
institutions and the level of economic growth and development of a country. 
This means that in order for a country to achieve a desired level of economic 
growth, their institutions have to be efficient, effective and transparent in the 
management and distribution of revenue.  
My findings show that the government of Ghana, with the passing of the 
PRMA, has shown that it is committed to transparency and fairness in the 
collection and distribution of petroleum revenue for the present generation. It 
has also recognized that oil is a non-renewable resource that can run out at 
any time. It has therefore set up funds to ensure that part of the revenue is 
utilized effectively now and the rest saved for use by future generations.  
Petroleum revenue is a just a means to an end therefore effective 
management by transparent institutions who use clear guidelines and 
regulations to guide their actions is necessary to transform the resource into 
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